Introduction
Prior studies suggest that the value of analysts' activities in the market stems from two sources:
analysts' skill at interpreting public information and/or their ability to collect and process private information (Chen et al. 2010 , Francis et al. 2002 , Frankel et al. 2006 , Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004 , Livnat and Zhang 2012 , Ramnath et al. 2008 . Evidence on the relative importance of the sources of value brought by analysts, however, is mixed. Findings in Francis et al. (2002) and Frankel et al. (2006) are consistent with the role of interpreting public information as a dominant source of value in analysts' research. Francis et al. (2002) , for example, find a positive association between the market reaction to earnings announcements and the market reaction to analysts' research reports, suggesting that analyst research and earnings announcements are complements of each other. In contrast, Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) and Chen et al. (2010) conclude that the value of analyst forecasts stems primarily from analysts' ability to collect and process private information.
They assume that analyst forecast revisions immediately following earnings announcements reflect analysts' interpretation of publicly available information, while revisions issued immediately prior to earnings announcements reflect analysts' ability to collect and process private information. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find that stock-price reactions to revisions are weakest in the first few weeks after prior-quarter earnings announcements and stronger in the week before current-quarter earnings announcements.
Livnat and Zhang (2012) contend that prior studies are misspecified because these studies consider earnings announcements as the only significant corporate public-information release and implicitly assume that analysts' interpretation role applies only to the information contained in earnings announcements.
Focusing on other significant disclosures, such as 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filings, Livnat and Zhang (2012) find that market reactions to forecast revisions issued promptly (within three trading days) after corporate disclosures are greater than reactions to non-prompt revisions. They conclude that investors value more highly analysts' ability to interpret public disclosures. Although we agree that ignoring other significant public corporate disclosures can result in erroneous conclusions, we note difficulties in disentangling the information content of the forecast revision from that of the firm disclosure itself. Because prompt revisions in Livnat and Zhang (2012) are defined as revisions made very close to the time of disclosure, it is virtually impossible to fully disentangle market reactions to prompt forecast revisions from reactions to disclosures.
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The stronger market reaction to prompt revisions may just reflect responses to the disclosures.
In this study, we take a different approach to address the issue of considering public disclosures in assessing the relative importance of the sources of value that analysts bring to the market. Within the framework of Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , we examine the timing and information content of analyst forecast revisions, conditional on the incidence of management earnings forecasts. We focus on management earnings forecasts because prior studies show that analysts update their forecasts in response to management earnings forecasts (e.g., Jennings 1987 , Waymire 1986 ). Firms often issue management earnings forecasts to align investor expectations with the information they possess or influence analysts and market expectation to achieve certain objectives (Baginski and Hassell 1990 , Cotter et al. 2006 , Patell 1976 , Pownall et al. 1993 . It could be the case that the temporal pattern of the market reaction to forecast revisions documented in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) is driven by management earnings forecasts. 2 If stronger market reactions to analyst forecast revisions before the current-quarter earnings announcements than to those immediately after the prior quarter earnings announcement are attributable to confounding effects of management earnings forecasts, which are public disclosures, it is difficult to conclude that Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) findings are consistent with the information discovery role being the dominant source of analysts' value.
To examine whether management earnings forecasts influence the timing, relative accuracy, and price impact of analyst forecast revisions, we partition the sample revisions into two subsamples:
revisions for firms that issue management earnings forecasts and those for firms that do not issue 1 Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) and Chen et al. (2010) exclude analyst forecast revisions on days 0 and 1 relative to the earnings announcements specifically to avoid the confounding effects of market reactions to the earnings announcement itself. 2 Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) acknowledge that analysts rely on guidance from insiders for forecast revisions, but they consider only implicit guidance given to select groups of investors and analysts. They do not consider guidance through public disclosures in the form of management earnings forecasts, nor do they examine the effect of public disclosures. management earnings forecasts during the quarter. We then compare the revision timing, relative forecast errors (calculated as the absolute value of the newly revised analyst forecast error minus the absolute value of the existing consensus forecast error), and stock-price responses to forecast revisions between the two subsamples. We also partition the sample period into pre-and post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) periods. Reg FD changes the way that firms communicate with financial analysts and hence changes the analysts' information environment. Prior studies (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2006 , Irani and Karamanou 2003 , Janakiraman et al. 2007 ) document a decrease in analyst following, forecast accuracy, and the firstforecast horizon, as well as an increase in analyst forecast dispersion following Reg. FD. Kross and Suk (2012) show that Reg FD also influences the interplay between management earnings forecasts and analyst forecast revisions. Because these changes potentially affect the value of analyst forecast revisions at different points in the event time, we also examine the timing and information content of analyst forecast revisions in pre-and post-Reg FD periods separately.
We first document that the timing of management earnings forecasts and that of analyst forecast revisions during the quarter have very similar temporal patterns, which is consistent with analysts updating forecasts in response to management earnings forecasts (e.g., Jennings 1987 , Patell 1976 .
Management earnings forecasts are more concentrated in the earnings announcement period during the post-Reg FD period, while the majority of management earnings forecasts are issued later in the quarter during the pre-Reg FD period. This shift in the temporal pattern around Reg FD is also apparent in analyst forecast revisions. Interestingly, we find that for firms issuing management earnings forecasts, the temporal pattern of relative forecast errors and that of management earnings forecasts are remarkably similar. Specifically, relative forecast errors are more negative (i.e., forecasts are more accurate relative to the existing consensus forecast) in weeks during which firms issue management earnings forecasts more frequently. Relative forecast errors are also more negative for firms with management earnings forecasts than for firms without management earnings forecasts, suggesting that management earnings forecasts influence analysts' information environment.
More importantly, we find that Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) results are largely driven by management earnings forecasts. We show that the evidence of weaker (stronger) price reaction to forecast revisions issued immediately after (before) the earnings announcement holds only for the sample of firms that issue management earnings forecasts. For firms without management earnings forecasts, we find no statistical difference between stock-price reactions to revisions in the post-announcement period and those in the pre-announcement period. In addition, stock-price responses to forecast revisions are greater for firms with management earnings forecasts than for firms without management earnings forecasts in the preannouncement period, while the opposite holds in the post-announcement period. The temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts seems to influence these differences in the temporal pattern of the information content between firms with and without management earnings forecasts.
We also directly control for news from management earnings forecasts issued immediately before or concurrently with analyst forecast revisions. We show that weaker (stronger) price reaction to forecast revisions issued immediately after (before) the earnings announcement disappears once we control for management earnings forecast news in the regression. Given that a management earnings forecast is public disclosure, this evidence casts doubt on Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) conclusion that the value of analyst forecast revisions stems primarily from analysts' ability to collect and process private information. If greater information content of forecast revisions in the pre-announcement period is largely attributable to management earnings forecasts issued immediately before or concurrently with analyst forecast revisions, it
should not be interpreted simply as investors appreciating analysts' private information gathering.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide new evidence that sheds light on the relative importance of the sources of value that analysts bring to the market. Although numerous studies find that analyst forecast revisions are price informative (e.g., Elton et al. 1981 , Givoly and Lakonishok 1979 , Givoly and Lakonishok 1980 , Griffin 1976 , Imhoff and Lobo 1984 , there is contradicting empirical evidence on the relative importance of two different roles of analysts' research:
information interpretation and information discovery (Francis et al. 2002; Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; Frankel et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2010) . By providing evidence that Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) results are largely attributable to the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts, our study demonstrates that it is important to consider public disclosures, such as management earnings forecasts, in evaluating the relative importance of the sources of value in analyst forecast revisions. Our study complements Livnat and Zhang (2012) , which also examine the influence of firm disclosures in assessing the relative importance of the analysts' roles in interpreting public information and discovering private information.
While Livnat and Zhang's (2012) results are not free from the confounding effects of market reactions to disclosure itself, both studies find that the relative importance of analysts' information discovery role documented in prior studies is likely to be overstated.
Our study also contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of management earnings forecasts. Earlier studies find that analysts update their forecasts in response to management earnings forecasts and that analyst forecasts become more accurate after management earnings forecasts (Cotter et al. 2006 , Jennings 1987 , Waymire 1986 . In this study, we find broader influences of management earnings forecasts on the characteristics of analyst forecasts. We show that management earnings forecasts influence the temporal pattern of analyst forecast revisions across the event time during the quarter. We also find that the temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy (i.e., improvement of analyst forecast accuracy through the revision) across the event time relative to earnings announcements is closely related to the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts. Moreover, we find that management earnings forecasts affect the temporal pattern of the price impact of analyst forecast revisions, which helps us better understand the relative importance of the sources of analysts' informational advantage.
We caution that our study does not suggest that analysts' information discovery role is unimportant.
There is ample evidence of the importance of acquiring information not readily available (e.g., Frazzini et al. 2010, Gintschel and Markov 2004) . Rather our analysis highlights the difficulty of evaluating the relative importance of the sources of value that financial analysts bring to the market based on the temporal pattern of the market reaction to forecast revisions because it is contaminated by confounding factors. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) Petroleum and Natural Gas, followed by Retail and Banking. In terms of the number of firms in the sample, Banking is the most represented industry, followed by Computer Software and Retail.
Research Issues

Timing of Forecast Revisions
We measure the timing of analyst forecast revisions relative to quarter q-1 and quarter q earnings announcement dates. For each individual analyst revision of the one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast, we determine the number of trading days between the revision date and the earnings announcement date. For revisions made at or prior to the mid-point of the quarter, we measure revision timing relative to the priorquarter (q-1) earnings announcement (trading days 0 through 32), and for revisions made after the midpoint of the quarter, we measure revision timing relative to the current-quarter (q) earnings announcement (trading days -30 through -1). These trading days usually span the entire quarter. We then group the forecast revisions into the following five periods based on timing:
Period 1 = days (0, 1) (announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings);
Period 2 = days (2, 6) (immediate post-announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings);
Period 3 = days (7, 32) (non-immediate post-announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings);
Period 4 = days (-30, -6) (non-immediate pre-announcement period of quarter q earnings); and 4 Including these forecast revisions does not change the results in any material manner. 5 We exclude the reiterating revisions of which the revised forecast is the same as the prior forecast.
Period 5 = days (-5, -1) (immediate pre-announcement period of quarter q earnings).
where quarter q is the quarter for which earnings are being forecasted. Our definitions of the timing and the periods closely follow those in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) and Kim et al. (2011) . We measure the timing of management earnings forecasts based on the same five periods outlined above. We compare the temporal patterns of management earnings forecasts and analyst forecast revisions at various points in the event time based on five periods defined above.
Relative Forecast Error
We calculate the relative forecast error, RFE, as the difference between the forecast error of the newly released one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast and the forecast error of the consensus forecast one day before the forecast revision. The consensus forecast summarizes the information available to all analysts prior to the forecast revision, whereas the new forecast conveys the incremental information upon which the analyst revises her/his forecast. Specifically, for every new earnings forecast made by analyst i for stock j on day t, we define the relative current forecast error RFE ijt as: 
where DPeriod 2 (3, 4, or 5) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the forecast revision is issued in Period 2 (3, 4, or 5), and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity at the end of quarter q-1; BM is book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of quarter q-1; COVERAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who issue quarterly EPS forecast between quarter q-1 and quarter q earnings announcement dates; SPECIAL is COMPUSTAT special items divided by sales for quarter q-1; LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if quarter q-1 EPS is negative, and zero otherwise; and DIFFICULTY is the analysts' mean consensus forecast error for quarter q-1 EPS.
We exclude revisions in Period 1 (days (0, 1)) from the multivariate regressions because (1) the consensus forecast is not defined on day 0 and the consensus forecast error on day 1 exists only when at least one analyst issues forecast on day 0, and (2) doing so is consistent with our approach in the stock price response analysis where we exclude such revisions to avoid the confounding effects of market reactions to the management earnings forecast itself. We control for the information environment that may affect analyst forecast error. Following the prior literature, we control for firm size (Clement and Tse 2005, Mikhail et al. 1997 ), book-to-market ratio, and number of analysts following the firm (Stickel 1989) . Inclusion of the number of analysts following the firm also controls for competition among analysts (Abarbanell et al. 1995) .
Earnings characteristics may also affect analysts' forecast timing following earnings announcements (Stickel 1989 , Zhang 2008 . To control for earnings characteristics, we include analyst forecast errors for prior quarter earnings (Zhang 2008) , an indicator for negative earnings (Hayn 1995) , and special items in earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002) .
We estimate equation (2) for the sample revisions for firms with and without management earnings forecasts and compare the coefficients on DPeriod 2-DPeriod 5 between the two groups. We also estimate the regression for sample revisions in the pre-and post-Reg FD period separately.
Stock-Price Response to Forecast Revisions
To examine whether management earnings forecasts influence the return sensitivity to forecast revisions over the event time, we regress stock-price responses on forecast revisions interacted with event-time indicators for the subsample of revisions for firms with and without management earnings forecasts. We measure the stock-price response to earnings forecast revision, R t, t+2 , as the cumulative abnormal stock returns over the three-day window from day t through day t+2, consistent with the measure in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) . Specifically,
where τ r and VWCRSP r τ denote raw returns on the stock and the return on the value-weighted CRSP index.
Consistent with Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , the forecast revision, FR, is defined as:
where new_forecast t is the revised forecast on day t and old_forecast is the last forecast by the same analyst before the revision. Following Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , we truncate FR t at 50% and -50%.
To make it consistent with Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , the regression model uses revision timing in three periods: D1 (days (7, 32) and days (-30, -6)), D2 (days (-5, -1)), and D3 (days (2, 6) 
where D1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if an analyst's forecast is issued between days (-30, -6) or (7, 32), and zero otherwise; D2 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if an analyst's forecast is issued between days (-5, -1), and zero otherwise; and D3 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if an analyst's forecast is issued between days (2, 6), and zero otherwise.
The three event-time indicator variables, D2, D3, and D1, split the event time into three periods as the pre-, post-, and non-announcement periods, respectively. Following Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004), we exclude the event days (0, 1) because price reactions on these days include price reactions to the information contained in prior-quarter earnings announcements. Although Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) do not include the control variables in the regression, we include them to control for firms' information environment and earnings characteristics. Excluding these control variables does not affect our results in any material way. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find that stock-price responses to earnings forecast revisions in the period immediately after the prior-quarter earnings announcement are weaker than those in the period immediately prior to the current-quarter earnings announcement (α 2 > α 3 ). If Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) results are driven by the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts, we may observe a weaker stock-price response to forecast revisions in the post-announcement period only in the sample of firms that issue management earnings forecasts, but not in the sample of firms without such forecasts.
Pre-and Post-Reg FD Periods
We also examine the timing and information content of analyst forecast revisions in pre-and post-Reg FD periods separately to better understand the relative importance of the sources of value that analysts bring to the market. Reg FD, which became effective on October 23, 2000, has changed the way that firms communicate with financial analysts and other market participants. Reg FD is intended to level the playing field and prohibits selective disclosure of material information to a subset of market participants, such as analysts and institutional investors, without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the investing public. For example, an advance warning about earnings telephoned to a security analyst must also be immediately released to the public. Following implementation of Reg FD, analysts no longer have access to manager's private information before that information becomes public.
Prior studies show that Reg FD leads to changes in analysts' information environment. Irani and Karamanou (2003) 
Empirical Results
Timing of Management Earnings Forecasts and Analyst Forecast Revisions
Panel A of we determine the consensus forecast based on forecasts issued since the prior-quarter earnings announcement. We also compare relative forecast errors between sample revisions for firms with management earnings forecasts and those for firms without management earnings forecasts. We find that relative forecast errors are more negative for firms with management earnings forecasts than those for firms without such forecasts. Greater improvement in forecast accuracy through the forecast revision for firms with management earnings forecasts relative to those for firms without such forecasts are observed both in the pre-and post-Reg FD periods. This evidence suggests that management earnings forecasts influence the analysts' information environment. (1)) are qualitatively the same as those tabulated in Table 4 .
Timing of Forecast Revisions and Relative Forecast Errors
9
As shown in Table 4 , consistent with results in Table 3 , relative forecast errors in Period 4 are the most negative, followed by those in Period 5, and then Period 3. We also compare relative forecast errors in different periods between firms with and without management earnings forecasts. Again, consistent with results in Table 3 , we find that improvement in analyst forecast accuracy through the forecast revision is greater (i.e., more negative coefficients on DPeriod2, DPeriod3, DPeriod4, and DPeriod5) for firms with management earnings forecasts than for firms without management earnings forecasts. Differences in coefficients are statistically significant at the one-percent level.
Similar patterns are observed in both the pre-and post-Reg FD periods (untabulated).
Improvement in analyst forecast accuracy through revisions is greater in the pre-announcement period than in the post-announcement period, and improvement in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for firms that issue management earnings forecasts. In sum, although our evidence for relative forecast errors is similar to that in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , analysts' ability to improve forecasts through revisions is significantly associated with the incidence of management earnings forecasts of firms whose earnings are forecasted. 9 We estimate forecast-error regressions and price-reaction regressions for firms with and without management earnings forecasts separately, because we need to compare coefficients not only between two subsamples but also across different periods for each subsample. The results from the pooled regressions with an indicator variable for the revisions with management earnings forecasts, along with interactions of the indicator variable and other variables, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5 .
To further gauge the influence of management earnings forecasts on the temporal pattern of relative forecast errors, we graph the frequency of management earnings forecasts and the mean relative forecast accuracy for firms with and without management earnings forecasts over the event time. In Figure 1 , event time is expressed as the number of weeks from the prior-quarter earnings announcement (for revisions made at or before the midpoint of the quarter) or the current-quarter earnings announcement (for revisions made after the midpoint of the quarter). We present relative forecast accuracy rather than relative forecast error for ease of presentation. We multiply relative forecast errors by negative one to calculate relative forecast accuracy and exclude day (0) because relative forecast error is undefined for revisions on the prior-quarter earnings announcement date.
As shown in Figure 1 , the temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy for firms that issue management earnings forecasts is remarkably similar to the temporal pattern of the frequency of management earnings forecasts. Specifically, relative forecast accuracy is higher in the period during which management earnings forecasts are more frequently issued. For firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts, the temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy is not as apparent as for firms with management earnings forecasts. The similarity in the temporal pattern of relative forecast accuracy and the frequency of management earnings forecasts over the event time is even more pronounced in the postReg FD period, potentially because revisions in the pre-Reg FD period are influenced not only by management earnings forecasts but also by implicit and selective management guidance of quarterly earnings. This evidence is consistent with Kross and Suk (2012) who find increases in analysts' use of public information such as management earnings forecasts after Reg FD.
Price Reaction to Forecast Revisions
So far, we show that (1) the temporal pattern of analyst earnings forecast revisions mimics the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts, (2) the shift in the temporal patterns of management earnings forecasts and analyst forecast revisions around Reg FD are similar, (3) relative forecast errors are more negative for firms with management earnings forecasts, and (4) the temporal pattern of relative forecast errors is remarkably similar to the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts.
In this section, we examine whether the information content of analyst forecast revisions at various points in the event time differs depending on whether or not firms issue management earnings forecasts. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find that stock-price responses to earnings forecast revisions are the weakest in the period immediately after the prior-quarter earnings announcement. If Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) results are driven by the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts, we may observe a weaker stock-price response to forecast revisions in the post-announcement period only in the sample of firms that issue management earnings forecasts, but not in the sample of firms without such forecasts.
We estimate regression equation (5) For firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts, the coefficient on FR*D2 and the coefficient on FR*D3 are not statistically different (t-value = 0.58), suggesting that the price impact of analyst forecast revisions in the post-announcement period is comparable to that of revisions in the preannouncement period.
Management earnings forecasts are public disclosures, and as such, price reactions to analyst forecast revisions following management earnings forecasts reflect investors' appreciation of analysts' skill at interpreting public information. In Table 2 and Figure 1 , we show that management earnings forecasts are most frequent in Periods 3 and 4, which corresponds to D1 in Table 5 . Note that we show that the stock-price reaction to revisions is the strongest in D1 (in Panel A of Table 5 ). Thus, the strongest market reaction to revisions in this period might actually be the reaction to management earnings forecasts, not analyst forecast revisions.
We also find that stock-price responses to forecast revisions are greater for firms with management earnings forecasts than for firms without management earnings forecasts during the non-announcement period (D1) and in the period immediately before the current-quarter earnings announcement (D2), while the opposite holds in the period immediately following the prior-quarter earnings announcement (D3).
Because management earnings forecasts are most frequent in Period 4, as shown in Table 2 , and because analysts tend to revised forecasts over several days subsequent to management earnings forecasts (Cotter et al. 2006 ), it appears that the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts influences the different temporal patterns of the information content of revisions between firms with and without management earnings forecasts. We also estimate regressions for upward and downward revisions separately and summarize the results in Table 6 . Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find that the coefficient on FR*D2 is greatest, followed by the coefficient on FR*D1. They find that the coefficient on FR*D3 is negative. We find that Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) result holds only for the pre-Reg FD period. For the post-Reg FD period, the difference between the coefficient on FR*D1 and that on FR*D2 is statistically insignificant. For the sample of downward revisions, we find that the coefficient on FR*D1 is the greatest, consistent with Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) .
More importantly though, Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) 
D2).
Finally, we directly control for the confounding effect of management earnings forecasts by including management earnings forecast news to the regression equation (5). We identify management forecasts issued between one day prior to and two days after individual analysts' forecast revision and compute management earnings forecast news, MF, as management earnings forecast minus mean consensus analyst forecast on the day before the issuance of management forecast, deflated by the absolute value of mean consensus analyst forecast. We assign zero value to MF if there is no management forecast issued prior to analyst forecast revision. We interact MF with the three event-time indicator variables, D2, D3, and D1, that split the event time into three periods as the pre-, post-, and nonannouncement periods, respectively. If management earnings forecast is a confounding factor that explains the temporal pattern of the market reaction to forecast revisions documented in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , the difference between the coefficient on FR*D2 and the coefficient on FR*D3 will become insignificant once we control for the effect of management earnings forecast news. Table 7 reports the results. The results with the full sample of analyst forecast revisions show significantly positive pricing impact of management forecasts issued in pre-announcement (D2) and nonannouncement periods (D1). More importantly, the difference between the coefficient on FR*D2 and the coefficient on FR*D3 is insignificant after controlling for the effect of management earnings forecast news. We find the similar results for both the pre-FD and post-FD period. Thus the evidence in Table 7 suggests that weaker (stronger) price reaction to forecast revisions issued immediately after (before) the earnings announcement is largely attributable for the confounding effect of management earnings forecasts.
In sum, we find that Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) results on the information content of analyst forecast revisions at various points in the event time hold only for firms that issue management earnings forecasts. We show that for firms without management earnings forecasts, the information content of forecast revisions in the period immediately following the prior-quarter earnings announcement is similar to that in the period immediately prior to the current-quarter earnings announcement. We also show that the temporal pattern of the market reaction to forecast revisions documented in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) disappears when we control for the confounding effect of management earnings forecasts.
Conclusions
Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) find that the relative precision and information content of analyst forecast revisions are lower immediately after the prior-quarter earnings announcement and greater before the current-quarter earnings announcement. They conclude that the value of analysts' informational advantage stems primarily from analysts' ability to collect and analyze private information rather than from analysts' skill at interpreting public information. We show that Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) results are largely driven by the confounding effect of management earnings forecasts.
We find that the temporal pattern of analyst forecast revisions across the event time relative to earnings announcements mimics the temporal pattern of management earnings forecasts. Furthermore, the temporal pattern of relative forecast errors and that of management earnings forecasts are remarkably similar. We also find that improvement in analysts' forecast accuracy through revisions is greater for firms that issue management earnings forecasts. More importantly, our results show that Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) finding of weaker stock-price responses to forecast revisions in the period immediately after the prior-quarter earnings announcement holds only for the sample of firms that issue management earnings forecasts. For firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts, stock-price responses to forecast revisions in the week following the prior-quarter earnings announcement is as strong as that in the week immediately before the current-quarter earnings announcement. This evidence is more pronounced in the post-Reg FD period. We further show that weaker (stronger) price reaction to forecast revisions issued immediately after (before) the earnings announcement, the evidence documented in Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , disappears when we control for the effect of management earnings forecasts news.
Thus the results suggest that management earnings forecasts affect the price impact of forecast revisions over the event time.
Overall, evidence in our study suggests that management earnings forecasts influence the timing as well as the relative accuracy and information content of analyst forecast revisions across the event time. To the extent that management earnings forecasts are public disclosures, our results cast doubt on Ivković and Jegadeesh's (2004) conclusion that analysts' ability to collect and process private information is the dominant source of value that analysts bring to the market. We caution that our results cannot be interpreted as evidence that the value of analyst forecasts does not come from analysts' ability to collect and process private information. Given the extent research that document the importance of acquiring information not readily available by exploiting a change in analyst regulations, whose effect is to raise the cost of obtaining such information (Gintshel and Markov 2004) , or an existence of educational ties to managers, whose effect is to lower the cost of obtaining it (Cohen et al. 2010) , it seems clear that the analysts' information discovery role is important. However, evaluating the relative importance of two sources of the value of analyst research, analysts' skill at interpreting public information and/or their ability to collect and process private information, based on the temporal pattern of the price impact of analyst forecast revision, is problematic because of the confounding effect of management earnings forecasts. The bar graph presents frequency of management earnings forecasts (MEFs) over the event time. The line graphs present the mean relative forecast accuracy for firms with and without management earnings forecasts over the event time. Following (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004) , event time is expressed as the number of weeks from the prior-quarter earnings announcement (for revisions made at or before the midpoint of the quarter) or the current quarter earnings announcement (for revisions made after the midpoint of the quarter) except Week 1. Week 1 includes only day (1), the first trading day after the priorquarter earnings announcement. We exclude day (0) because relative forecast error is undefined for revisions on the prior-quarter earnings announcement date. Relative forecast accuracy is calculated as relative forecast error multiplied by (-1) and the greater magnitude of relative forecast accuracy represents more accurate analyst forecast relative to the existing consensus forecast. Left-side Y-axis represents relative forecast accuracy and right-side Y-axis represents the frequency of MEFs. Table 2 670,879
Less: Revisions of which relative forecast error cannot be determined (174,139) Number of revisions with relative forecast error in Table 3 496,740
Less: Revisions issued on the day after the earnings announcement (111,954) Number of revisions used for regressions in Tables 4 and 5 384,786 Panel A summarizes the sample selection procedure. Panel B presents the sample distribution by year. We obtain analysts' one-quarter-ahead earnings per share forecast from I/B/E/S detail files for the period from January 1996 to December 2009. Earnings announcement dates are obtained from COMPUSTAT. Forecast revisions are grouped into the following five periods based on timing: Period 1: days (0, 1) (announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings); Period 2: days (2, 6) (immediate post-announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings); Period 3: days (7, 32) (non-immediate post-announcement period of quarter q-1 earnings); Period 4: days (-30, -6) (non-immediate pre-announcement period of quarter q earnings); and Period 5: days (-5, -1) (immediate pre-announcement period of quarter q earnings); where quarter q is the quarter for which earnings are being forecasted. Trading days 0 through 32 are measured as the number of trading days relative to EAD q-1 , and trading days -30 through -1 are measured as the number of trading days relative to EAD q . Period 1 is further divided into Day 0 and 1 relative to EAD q-1 . (0) is not defined because we compute the consensus forecast by the average of forecasts issued after EAD q-1 (quarter q-1 earnings announcement date). 3, 4, or 5) , and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity at the end of quarter q-1; BM is book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of quarter q-1; COVERAGE is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who issue quarterly EPS forecast between quarter q-1 and quarter q earnings announcement dates; SPECIAL is COMPUSTAT special items divided by sales for quarter q-1; LOSS is an indictor variable that takes the value of one if quarter q-1 EPS is negative, and zero otherwise; and DIFFICULTY is the analysts' mean consensus forecast error for quarter q-1 EPS. We divide sample revisions into revisions by firms that issue management earnings forecasts (with MEF) and those by firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). is the cumulative abnormal stock returns over three-day window from day t through day t+2 where day t is the date of forecast revision; FR is individual analyst forecast revision deflated by the absolute value of prior forecast; D1 is an indicator of non-announcement period which takes the value of one if an analyst's forecast is issued between days (-30, -6) or (7, 32), and zero otherwise; D2 is an indicator of pre-announcement period which takes the value of one if an analyst's forecast is issued between days (-5, -1), and zero otherwise; D3 is an indicator of post-announcement period which takes the value of one if an analyst's forecast is issued between days (2, 6), and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in Table 4 . We truncate FR at ±50%. We divide sample revisions into revisions by firms that issue management earnings forecasts (with MEF) and those by firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter. Panel A presents regression results for revisions over the entire sample period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , and Panel B presents results for revisions during the pre-and post-Reg FD periods. We define years between 1996 and 2000 and pre-Reg FD period and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD period. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Tables 4 and 5 . We truncate FR at ±50%. We divide sample revisions into revisions by firms that issue management earnings forecasts (with MEF) and those by firms that do not issue management earnings forecasts (without MEF) during the quarter. Panel A (B) presents results for upward (downward) revisions during the pre-and post-Reg FD periods. We define years between 1996 and 2000 and pre-Reg FD and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). where MF is news from management earnings forecasts issued between one day prior to and two days after an individual analyst's forecast revision. MF is measured as management's earnings forecasts minus mean consensus analyst forecast computed on the day before the issuance of management forecasts, deflated by the absolute value of mean consensus analyst forecast. We assign zero value to MF if there is no management forecast issued prior to the analyst's forecast revision. Other variables are defined in Tables 4 and 5 . We truncate FR at ±50%. We define years between 1996 and 2000 and pre-Reg FD period and between 2001 and 2009 as post-Reg FD period. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated based on standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the analyst and quarter levels. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed).
